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In the 20th century, several scholars have offered definitions of civil-military 
relations and how to establish optimal balance between civilian and military authorities. 
At the start of this century, the European Union (EU) has begun the final process of 
organizing its security and defense policy. It has developed since 1991 a legal framework 
for its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with the treaties of Maastricht, 
Amsterdam, and Nice. The last entered into force on 1 February 2003. The Union also 
established its own military and civilian crisis management capabilities, with the 
European Council decisions at Helsinki in December 1999 and Feira in June 2000. 
Furthermore, the EU established new institutions, namely the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC), the Military Committee (EUMC), the Military Staff (EUMS), and the 
Civilian Crisis Management Committee (CIVCOM). In December 2001, at Laeken, the 
Heads of State and Government announced that the EU “is now able to conduct some 
crisis management operations.”1 This gives evidence that the EU is willing to accept 
responsibility as an international military actor. The EU has accepted that the goals of a 
modern security policy have changed from the traditional tasks for armed forces, the 
protection of independence and territorial integrity, toward an increasing focus on 
multilateral and multinational actions in support of crisis management and the promotion 
of stability. Many of the requirements set forth by civil-military scholars for civilian 
control of armed forces are being discussed during the decision making process of an EU 
constitution by the European Convention. Because of the unique character of the EU and 
its unique path of development, the manner in which the European Union will execute 
civilian control appears to be somewhat different than the models set forth by civil-
military scholars who have written primarily about national political systems. 
Nevertheless, the question, which has to be answered, is: “which institutions are 
responsible for civilian control of EU-led military missions?” 
This thesis deals in Chapter II with the theoretical framework of civilian control. 
First it provides a definition of civilian control of armed forces and deals with theories of 
                                                 
1 See Presidency Conclusion – European Council Meeting in Laeken 14 and 15 December 2001 
Internet Website Website http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/ec/68827.pdf from 31 May 2003 
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civilian control of armed forces, their counterarguments and how these theoretical 
frameworks correspond with the European Union. In addition, it describes the 
foundations of civilian control, lists specific elements required for effective civilian 
control of armed forces, and compares these foundations with recent development within 
the European Union. Lastly, it argues that in respect to the European Union, the terms 
“civilian control” and “democratic control” are interchangeable. 
Chapter III describes the parliamentary dimension of civilian control. In so doing, 
it compares the different approaches and possibilities of the national parliaments of the 
Member States of the European Union, to participate in the decision making process 
regarding the deployment of military troops abroad. The second part of the chapter 
describes the involvement of the European Parliament in the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. It deals in particular with the budgetary power of the European 
Parliament and how it gets and handles relevant classified information. 
Chapter IV analyzes four challenges which the European Union will face 
regarding an effective civilian control of armed forces. These challenges are the weak 
involvement of the national parliaments in the area of Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, the restricted access to classified information for both the national parliaments 
and the European Parliament, the restricted right of oversight and scrutiny of the 
European Parliament, and the problem of the different security status of each of the 
Member States of the European Union. 
The Conclusion summarizes the findings of the thesis and presents proposals on 
how to heal some of the deficiencies in the area of civilian control of armed forces. 
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A. DEFINITION OF CIVILIAN CONTROL 
In general, civilian control of armed forces means the subordination of the 
military to democratically elected political authorities. “It means that all decisions 
concerning the defense of the country must be taken by those elected to take charge of the 
country’s affairs.”2 For democracies, as the U.S. scholar Richard Kohn mentioned, 
civilian control is fundamental. “Civilian control allows a nation to base its values and 
purposes, its institutions and practices, on the popular will rather than on the choices of 
military leaders, whose outlook, by definition, focuses on the need for internal order and 
external security.”3 In this thesis, the EU context of civilian control means accountability 
of the Commission and the Council to the European Parliament, as the only directly 
elected institution of the European Union. 
Perhaps the best known scholar in the area of civilian control of armed forces is 
Samuel Huntington. In his book, The Soldier and the State – The Theory and Politics of 
Civil-Military Relations, published in 1957, he described two different kinds of civilian 
control, namely subjective and objective civilian control. Subjective civilian control is 
defined as the maximization of civilian power of some particular civilian groups4, 
foremost particular governmental institutions. According to Huntington, “the essence of 
subjective civilian control is the denial of an independent military sphere.”5 It leads, 
consequently, to the involvement of the military in institutional, class, and constitutional 
politics or, in other words, in military participation in politics. Huntington rejected 
subjective civilian control because he thought that it tends to corrupt the professional 
quality of the armed forces. Instead he preferred the other form of civilian 
                                                 
2 Rose, Charlie: Democratic Control of the Armed Forces. A parliamentary role in Partnership for 
Peace. NATO Review Web Edition, pp.13-19, No. 5 Oct 1994 Vol. 42 Internet Website 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1994/9405-4.htm from 31 May 2003. See also Cottey, Andrew, Edmunds, 
Timothy, and Forster, Anthony (ed.): Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe, 
Palgrave Publishers Ltd., Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire 2002 
3 Kohn, Richard H.: The Forgotten Fundamentals of Civilian Control of the Military in Democratic 
Governments. John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, Internet Website under 
construction 
4 Huntington, Samuel P.: The Soldier and the State – The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations, p. 80, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 1957 renewed 1985 
5 ibid, p. 83 
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control, objective civilian control. Defined as “the maximizing of military 
professionalism”6, the final consequence of objective civilian control is establishing the 
military as a tool of the state by militarizing the military. In Huntington’s view “the 
achievement of objective civilian control has only been possible […] since the emergence 
of the military profession.”7 The conditions needed to maximize military professionalism 
and objective civilian control are the power of civilian groups within society relative to 
the officer corps and the compatibility of the professional military ethic with the political 
ideologies prevailing in society. The relationship between political leaders and the officer 
corps is characterized in that the former will give the orders and “a highly professional 
officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures 
legitimate authority within the state.”8 This means that the military officer is an 
autonomous professional and “an officer corps focused on its own profession – and 
granted sufficient independence to organize itself and practice the art of war without 
interference in those areas which required technical expertise – would be politically 
neutral and less likely to intervene in politics.”9 Like Huntington, Morris Janowitz, 
another scholar in the area of civilian control of armed forces, in his book, The 
Professional Soldier – A Social and Political Portrait, published in 1964, dealt with the 
officer corps and the concept of professionalism10. In contrast to Huntington however, 
Janowitz’s professionalism is not of “traditional nature” but a result of “pragmatic 
doctrine”.11 This means, that Janowitz believes that although the military does not 
participate directly in politics, it is strongly linked to the political system and the state. 
                                                 
6 ibid, p. 83 
7 ibid, p. 85 
8 ibid, p. 84 
9 Kohn, Richard H., p. 4 
10 Janowitz, Morris: The Professional Soldier – A Social and Political Portrait. First Free Press 
Paperback Edition 1964 
11 ibid, p. 418 
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Some authors have questioned the validity of the claim that objective civilian 
control is the only proper way of democratically controlling the armed force.12 First of 
all, they argue that “the paradox of Huntington’s formulation is that the greater a 
military’s autonomy, the less control civilians actually exercise.”13 Furthermore, they 
disagree because “some countries do successfully practice a type of democratic control 
that is very close to subjective civilian control.”14 An example for this is Switzerland, 
“where people traditionally have an aversion to centralized state power and a ‘deeply 
rooted mistrust of military professionalism’.”15  
Another argument against Huntington is that he developed his model during the 
height of the Cold War. Hew Strachan, in his book, The Politics of the British Army, 
argued that Huntington was “concerned with America’s problems in adapting to the 
maintenance of a large military establishment in peacetime, and with the attendant 
difficulties of social and political integration.”16 In opposition to Huntington, Strachan 
referred to Amos Perlmutter, who identified three types of military organization in the 
modern nation-state and noticed that “what varies […] is the political order, and it is this 
which shapes the character of the soldier. The soldier himself is in a job which is 
inherently political […] [which means] ‘the military cannot take a neutral political 
stance’.”17 He states that “the most obvious manifestation of the fact that the army must 
be politicized [is] because […] ‘it is in the service of the state and the authorities’”18 and 
adds “what limits the impact of their intervention is not that the army is inherently 
political – because it is not – but the political culture within which the army is 
operating.”19 
                                                 
12 See for example Born, Hans / Caparini, Marina / Haltiner, Karl: Models of democratic control of 
the armed forces – A multi-country study comparing ‘good practices’ of democratic control. Geneva Centre 
for the democratic control of armed forces (DCAF) Working Paper Series – No. 47. Internet Website 
http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/Working_Papers/47.pdf from 31 May 2003. Kohn, Richard H.: The 
Forgotten Fundamental of Civilian Control of the Military in Democratic Government. Strachan, Hew: The 
Politics of the British Army, Clarenon Press, Oxford, New York 1997 
13 Kohn, Richard H., p. 4 
14 Born, Hans: p. 5 
15 Born, Hans: p. 5 
16 Strachan, Hew: p. 11 
17 ibid, p. 17 
18 Strachan, Hew: p. 19 
19 ibid, p. 19 
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This point corresponds with that of Morris Janowitz, who predicted that armed 
forces would transform into constabulary forces. He states: 20 
The use of force in international relations has been so altered that it seems 
appropriate to speak of constabulary forces rather than of military forces 
[…] The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is 
continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and 
seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has 
incorporate a protective military posture.  
This means that this kind of armed forces is more likely used by the politicians to 
establish peace in international or intranational disputes. Nevertheless, Janowitz 
emphasizes that the field of operations should be international, not domestic, when he 
points out, “extensive involvement of the military as an internal police force – except as 
the reserve instrument of ultimate legitimate force – would hinder the development of the 
constabulary concept in international relations.”21 He ends his book with the claim that 
“political control of the military profession hinges on the answer to the question why do 
officers fight.”22 His answer on this point is their professional ethic. In contrast to 
Huntington, Janowitz claims a close convergence between civilian and military values: 23 
The constabulary officer performs his duties, which includes fighting, 
because he is a professional with a sense of self-esteem and moral worth. 
Civilian society permits him to maintain his code of honor and encourages 
him to develop his professional skill. He is amenable to civilian political 
control because he recognizes that civilians appreciate and understand the 
tasks and responsibilities of the constabulary forces. He is integrated into 
civilian society because he shares its common values. 
Some critics of Janowitz question the difference between his professional ethics 
and Huntington’s military professionalism. As Peter Feaver states, “in fact, then, the 
primary control mechanism for Janowitz is the same value-based one that Huntington 
relied on: professionalism, albeit differently constituted.”24 Janowitz’s prediction that 
armed forces would transform into constabulary forces was opposed by Eliot Cohen. He 
stated in his book, Supreme Command, that “those who predicted a mere constabulary 
                                                 
20 Janowitz, Morris: p. 418 
21 ibid, p. 420 
22 ibid, p. 440 
23 ibid, p. 420 
24 Feaver, Peter D.: The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of 
Civilian Control. Armed Forces & Society, Volume 23 Number 2. pp. 149-178, Winter 1996 
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role for the military, hence its transmutation into a kind of heavily armed police force, 
have been proven wrong. Two real wars – Vietnam and the Persian Gulf – have been 
fought between the time those predictions appeared and the present day.”25 
A third scholar of civilian control of armed forces is Charles Moskos. He sought 
to combine the two theories of Huntington and Janowitz. “In trying to assess the 
relationship of the armed forces and the society to American society then, it is useful to 
conceive of a continuum ranging from a military organization highly differentiated from 
civilian society to a military system that is highly convergent with civilian structures.”26 
His examples are the Armed Services of the United States, whose organizational 
characteristics tend toward convergence with civilian structures, which he describes as 
“most apparent in the Air Force, somewhat less so in the Navy, and least of all in the 
Army and especially the Marine Corps.”27 
 
B. INTERCHANGEABILITY OF “CIVILIAN CONTROL” AND 
“DEMOCRATIC CONTROL” ON THE EUROPEAN UNION LEVEL 
As mentioned, in the context of this thesis, civilian control means accountability 
of the Commission and the Council to the European Parliament. It includes certain 
elements of civilian control, which are discussed below, as well as parliamentary 
oversight and scrutiny. In this respect, some authors make a distinction between 
democratic control and civilian control. As an example, Wim Ekkelen states that “the 
point is that civilian leadership is not necessarily democratic.”28 This means that 
democracy is a prerequisite for democratic but not for civilian control. The Member 
States of the European Union must be established democracies, as the Treaty on 
European Union states that it “is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles, which are 
                                                 
25 Cohen, Eliot A.: Supreme Command – Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime, p. 240, The 
Free Press, Simon & Schuster Inc., New York 2002 
26 Moskos, Charles C. Jr.: Armed Forces and American Society: Convergence or Divergence? In: 
Moskos, Charles C. Jr.: Public Opinion and the Military Establishment pp. 271-294, Sage Publications Inc., 
Beverly Hills, California 1971 
27 ibid, p. 272 
28 Eekelen, Wim: Democratic Control of Armed Forces – The national and international parliamentary 
dimension. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Occasional Paper No.2, 
Internet Website http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/Occasional_Papers/2.pdf from 31 May 2003 
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common to the Member States.”29 The Treaty of Nice amended Article 7, and introduced 
a procedure on how to deal with a serious and persistent breach of these principles by a 
member state. As a result, the member state concerned can be suspended from certain 
rights deriving from the application of the treaty.30 By definition then, a national 
government must be democratic to participate in EU political decisions. In the same 
manner, the draft of the first sixteen paragraphs of a Constitution for the European Union 
also addresses, in Article 2, the Principles of the Union, which are “human dignity, 
liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights.”31 The Copenhagen 
Criteria, discussed below, which are prerequisites to join the European Union, also 
reinforce this requirement. 
Therefore, to be or to become a member of the European Union requires that the 
state concerned be an established democracy. This fact explains why, on the European 
Union level, the terms “civilian control” and “democratic control” can be used 
interchangeably. 
 
C. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 1. Institutions 
Explaining civilian control at the European Union level requires some familiarity 
with the institutions, committees, and staffs, which are responsible for implementation of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The institutions involved in CFSP at 
the European level are the Council of the EU, the Commission, and the European 
Parliament. Regarding Article 46 of the current Treaty of Nice, the Court of Justice is 
excluded from the CFSP.  
Despite the circumstance that the main actors of the CFSP are the Member States 
of the European Union, the most important actor at the European Union level is the 
European Council. It brings together the Heads of State or Government of the Member 
                                                 
29 Article 6 (1) Treaty on European Union (TEU) Internet Website Consolidated Versions of the 
Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty establishing the European Community (2002). Internet 
Website http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/c_325/c_32520021224en00010184.pdf from 31 May 
2003 (italics from the author) 
30 See Article 7 (3) TEU 
31 Article 2 Draft Articles 1 to 16 of the Constitutional Treaty Internet Website http://european-
convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/CV00528.EN03.pdf from 31 May 2003 (italics from the author) 
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States of the EU and the President of the Commission. They are assisted by the Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs of the Member States and by a member of the Commission. Regarding 
Article 4 of the TEU “the European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary 
impetus for its development and shall define the general political guidelines thereof.” 
Furthermore, with respect to the CFSP, the European Council “shall define the principles 
of and the guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for matters 
with defense implications.”32 It does this by defining, by consensus, common strategies 
in areas where the Member States have important interests in common. Such common 
strategies set out the objectives, duration, and the means to be made available by the 
Union and the Member States.33  
The Council of the European Union makes the necessary decisions defining and 
implementing the Common Foreign and Security Policy, on the basis of the general 
guidelines defined by the European Council.34 In the case of the CFSP, the 
representatives of the Council are the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States 
of the EU. The Council is also responsible for recommending common strategies to the 
European Council and implementing them, in particular by adopting joint actions and 
common positions. A joint action addresses specific situations where operational action 
by the EU is deemed to be required. It lays down its objectives, scope, the means to be 
made available to the Union, its necessary duration, and the conditions for its 
implementation.35 An example for such a joint action is the takeover of the military 
operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
The Commission is indirectly involved in the CFSP, as it “shall be fully 
associated in the tasks referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2.”36 As mentioned, the President 
of the Commission joins the Heads of State or Government within the European Council. 
The Commission participates in meetings of the Council and its preparatory bodies and in 
                                                 
32 Article 13 (1) TEU 
33 See Article 13 (2) TEU 
34 See Article 13 (3) TEU 
35 See Article 14 (1) TEU 
36 Article 18 (3) TEU. The paragraphs 1 and 2 refer to the presidency, which shall represent the Union 
in matters coming within the CFSP (Paragraph 1) and shall be responsible for the implementation of 
decision taken under this title (Paragraph 2) 
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the political dialogue with third countries. Additionally, regarding Article 14 (4), “the 
Council may request the Commission to submit to it any appropriate proposal relating to 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy to ensure the implementation of joint actions.” 
 
 2. Committees and Staff 
With the conclusions of the European Council in Nice in December 2000 and the 
decisions of the Council on 22 January 2001, the Union established the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), and the 
European Union Military Staff (EUMS) on a permanent basis.37 These committees and 
the EUMS were created in order to allow the EU to assume its responsibilities and fully 
play its role on the international stage.38  
The PSC is made up of officials of ambassadorial rank from each member state of 
the EU. Its tasks are: 39 
• To keep track of the international situation in the areas falling 
within the common foreign and security policy, help to define 
policies by drawing up “opinions” for the Council, either at the 
request of the Council or on its own initiative, and to monitor 
implementation of agreed policies; 
• To examine the areas of General Affairs Council draft conclusions 
in which it is involved; 
• To provide guidelines for other Committees on matters falling 
within CFSP; 
• To maintain a privileged link with the Secretary-General/High 
Representative and the special representatives; 
• To send guidelines to the Military Committee and receive the 
opinions and recommendations of the Military Committee. The 
Chairman of the Military Committee, who liaises with the 
European Union Military Staff, takes part, where necessary, in 
PSC meetings; 
                                                 
37 With these decisions, a Civilian Crisis Management Committee was also created. This thesis only 
deals with civilian control of armed forces; the non-military aspects of crisis management are excluded 
from this paper 
38 See Draft Presidency Report on the European Security and Defense Policy for the European 
Council in Nice Point II: Establishment of permanent political and military structures, Internet Website 
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/00/st14/14056-r3en0.pdf from 31 May 2003 
39 ibid, Annex III 
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• To receive information, recommendations and opinions from the 
Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management and send it 
guidelines on matters falling within the CFSP; 
• To coordinate, supervise, and monitor discussion on CFSP issues 
in various Working Parties, to which it may send guidelines and 
whose reports it must examine; 
• To lead the political dialogue in its own capacity and in the forms 
laid down in the Treaty; 
• To provide a privileged forum for dialogue on the European 
Security and Defense Policy with the fifteen and the six40 as well 
as with NATO in accordance with arrangements set out in the 
relevant documents; 
• To take responsibility, under the auspices of the Council, for the 
political direction of the development of military capabilities, 
taking into account the type of crisis to which the Union wishes to 
respond. As part of the development of military capabilities, the 
PSC will receive the opinion of the Military Committee assisted by 
the European Military Staff. 
The PSC exercises political control and strategic direction of the EU’s military 
response to a crisis. To enable the PSC to do this, the following arrangements were put in 
place at the European Council in Nice: 41 
• With a view to launching an operation, the PSC sends the Council 
a recommendation based on the opinions of the Military 
Committee in accordance with the usual Council preparation 
procedures. On that basis the Council decides to launch the 
operation within the framework of a joint action; 
• In accordance with Articles 18 and 26 of the TEU, the joint action 
will determine, in particular, the role of the Secretary-
General/High Representative in the implementation of the 
measures falling within the "political control and strategic 
direction" exercised by the PSC. For such measures the Secretary-
General/High Representative acts with the PSC’s assent. Should a 
new Council decision be deemed appropriate, the simplified 
written procedure could be used (Article 12 (4) of the Council's 
Rules of Procedure); 
                                                 
40 The “fifteen” are the European NATO non EU member states as well as the candidate countries for 
the accessions to the EU: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Island, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Turkey, the “six” encompass the European 
NATO non EU member states: Czech Republic, Hungary, Island, Norway, Poland, Turkey 
41 See Draft Presidency Report on the European Security and Defense Policy for the European 
Council in Nice Annex III 
 11
• During the operation, the Council will be kept informed through 
PSC reports presented by the Secretary-General/High 
Representative in his capacity as Chairman of the PSC. 
In the event of a crisis, the chair of the PSC will be handed over to the High 
Representative.42 
The EUMC is composed of the Member States’ Chiefs of Defense, represented by 
their military representatives. Its mission is to provide the PSC with military advice and 
recommendations on all military matters within the EU. These recommendations are 
based upon the evaluation of the European Union Military Staff and include advice on the 
Concept of Operations and a Draft Operations Plan drawn up by the Operation 
Commander. It also exercises military direction to all military activities within the EU 
framework. 43 
The EUMS, which is part of the General Secretariat of the Council, is composed 
of military personnel from the Member States. Its mission is to perform early warning, 
situation assessment, and strategic planning for Petersberg Tasks (defined below). It is 
the source of the EU’s military expertise under the direction of the EUMC. During a 
crisis management operation it continuously monitors all the military aspects of 
operations and conducts strategic analysis in liaison with the designated operation 
commander to support the EUMC in its advisory role to the PSC in charge of the strategic 
direction.44 
 
D. COMPARISON OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF CIVILIAN 
CONTROL WITH THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
These different theoretical concepts analyzed in Chapter II.A. pose questions for 
the European Union. As Richard Kohn mentioned, civilian control is a process and not a 
fact. Therefore these concepts correspond in different ways to the military forces 
established by the European Union. The ideas of civil-military scholars pose challenges 
                                                 
42 ibid, see Annex III 
43 ibid, see Annex IV 
44 ibid, see Annex V 
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to the development of future European military forces. Five significant examples of the 
implications of these theoretical concepts merit examination. 
First of all, Morris Janowitz in the early 1960s predicted a change in the armed 
forces toward constabulary forces, a prediction that seemed prescient in the 1990s. In the 
case of the European Union, the military forces, established in 1999 at the European 
Council Summit in Helsinki, have to conduct the so-called Petersberg tasks as their 
primary mission. These tasks, amended to the Treaty on European Union in Amsterdam 
in 1997, include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat 
force in crisis management, including peacemaking. At present there is a discussion in 
the European Union to amend it further to include the fight against terrorism,45 but 
nevertheless, the development of these military forces will, in the foreseeable future, not 
lead to a European army. Instead, the draft of the EU Constitution talks about “structured 
cooperation” between those Member States “which fulfill higher criteria for military 
capabilities and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area 
with a view to more demanding tasks”.46 The “Mini Defense Summit” of Belgium, 
France, Germany, and Luxemburg on 29 April 2003, can be seen, in some respects, as 
such a cooperation. Additionally, a closer cooperation will be established within the 
Union framework, as regards to mutual defense.47  
Second, there is a clear distinction, as Huntington proposed, between military and 
political leaders. Within the institutional framework of the European Union, the PSC, 
which is made up of officials of ambassadorial rank, sends guidelines to the EUMC, the 
Member States’ Chiefs of Defense.  
Third, it must be mentioned that some military leaders are highly political. For 
example, the Chairman of the Military Committee, General Gustav Hägglund, publicly 
                                                 
45 The new Article 17 of the Convention’s proposal “Draft Articles on external action in the 
Constitutional Treaty” includes additionally “support action in combating terrorism at the request of a third 
country, and post-conflict stabilization.” Available at Internet Website 
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/cv00/cv00685en03.pdf from 31 May 2003 
46 ibid Article 30 (6) 
47 See Article 30 (7) 
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stated at the end of February 2003 that “in my opinion, it is time for the European Union 
to focus also on the protection of its own citizens and to create something comparable to 
the homeland defense in Northern America.”48 With this statement, the chairman of the 
highest military body of the European Union is, in some respects, able to lead the 
political and public discussion in a certain direction. Such an action agrees with Hew 
Strachan’s and Amos Perlmutter’s argument on the inherently political job of a soldier. 
Fourth, the EU maintains a distinction between military forces and police, as 
Morris Janowitz emphasized. For both forces, different “Headline Goals” were 
developed, with a clear delineation of responsibilities. In addition, this division is also 
apparent in the different committees created to deal with military and non-military issues 
of crisis management. The primarily tasks for the military forces remain, with respect to 
the Petersberg Tasks, international. 
Fifth, the EU military forces are professional forces in the sense of the definition 
of Janowitz. He defined a professional soldier “as a person who has made the military 
establishment the locus of his career.”49 Even though conscription has not totally 
disappeared in Europe, up to now no conscripts are part of the troops to be deployed for 
an EU-led crisis management mission. 
 
E. POSSIBLE FORMS OF CIVILIAN CONTROL AND THEIR ELEMENTS 
The subordination of the military to democratically elected political authorities, 
inherent to civilian control, can take many forms. According to Richard H. Kohn50, it is 
based on four foundations. The first foundation is democratic governance, which means 
the openness of the institutions, participation, accountability, effectiveness, and 
coherence.51 Second are the methods by which civilian authority rules military forces. In 
essence, this means that the executive, legislative and judiciary branches of the 
government should be divided. Parliamentary accountability is important in this respect. 
                                                 
48 See Euobserver statement at 28 February 2003 Internet Website 
http://www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?sid=13&aid=9536 from 31 May 2003 
49 Janowitz, Morris, p. 54 
50 Kohn, Richard H., p. 6-8 
51 See European Governance: A White Paper, published by the European Commission 25 July 2001, 
Internet Website http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf from 31 May 2003, 
p. 10 
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As Kohn states “Accountability to parliament or to the legislature implies accountability 
to the populace […] actively exercised, parliamentary power over the military contributes 
to a transparency in military affairs […]”52 A third foundation for civilian control is 
countervailing power. This means first and foremost that in the military, illegal acts will 
not be tolerated. “The more likely that violations of civilian control will not be forgiven 
and will be met by effective resistance, the less likely they are to occur.”53 Finally, the 
last foundation for civilian control is the support for it by the military itself. Kohn defines 
this point by saying that “the fundamental assumption behind civilian supremacy is the 
abstinence by the military from intervention in government and political life.”54 
Within the framework of the EU, these foundations are reflected as follows: 
• The political system of the European Union is based on democratic 
governance. The Treaty on European Union expresses this core element (Article 
6) and additionally some specific criteria must also be fulfilled to join the union. 
In June 1993 at the European Council in Copenhagen, the Heads of State and 
Government determined certain criteria for EU admission, which must be 
achieved by each applicant prior to entry. Membership to the European Union 
requires that the candidate country fulfill three goals: 55 
1. Political: stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities; 
2. Economic: a functioning market economy; 
3. Incorporation of the Community acquis: adherence to the various 
political, economic and monetary aims of the European Union. 
• The executive of the European political system is the Commission, which 
defines the principles of and guidelines for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. Nevertheless, despite these tasks, the Commission is only indirectly 
involved in the CFSP, as it “shall be fully associated in the tasks referred to in 
                                                 
52 ibid, p. 7 
53 ibid, p. 7 
54 ibid, p. 8 
55 Copenhagen Criteria. See Internet Website http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cig/g4000a.htm 
from 31 May 2003 
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paragraphs 1 and 2.”56 The legislative branch of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy relies on the responsibility of the Member States of the EU since 
the second pillar is inter-governmentally organized. The main point of critique is 
that the European Parliament is not involved in the decision-making process of 
the deployment of military troops for EU-led crisis management operations. 
Regarding Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union, the European Parliament 
must only be informed by the Presidency and the Council of the EU. The 
judiciary at the EU level is not involved in the CFSP, which is a second point of 
critique. Regarding Article 46 of the current TEU of Nice, the Court of Justice is 
excluded from the CFSP. However, the demand for a division of executive, 
legislative and judiciary branches is fulfilled at the national level by each member 
state, 
• With respect to countervailing power, troops are normally deployed under 
the jurisdiction of the national legal system, which guarantees the rule of law and 
that illegal acts will not be tolerated. As mentioned, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union is excluded from the legal scrutiny of the CFSP. As a result, this 
founding principle remains fulfilled at the national level. 
Civilian control of armed forces is not limited only to these four foundations. It 
also requires a number of specific elements to be effective. Those elements can be 
summarized as:57 
• A clear legal and constitutional framework, defining the basic relationship 
between the state and armed forces; 
                                                 
56 Article 18 (3) TEU 
57 See Carnovale, Marco: NATO partner and allies – Civil-military relations and democratic control of 
the armed forces. NATO Review Web Edition, pp. 32-35 No. 2 Mar 1997 Vol. 45 Internet Website 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1997/9702-9.htm from 31 May 2003. Cottey, Andrew, Edmunds, 
Timothy, and Forster, Anthony (ed.): Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe. Joò, 
Rudolf: The democratic control of armed forces – The experience of Hungary. European Union Institute for 
Security Studies. Chaillot Paper No 23. Internet Website http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai23e.html from 
31 May 2003. Kohn, Richard H.: The Forgotten Fundamentals of Civilian Control of the Military in 
Democratic Government. Rose Roth Seminar Odessa September 1998 – Democratic Control of the Armed 
Forces. Internet Website http://www.naa.be/archivedpub/special/ar243gen9860-odessa.asp from 31 May 
2003 
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• A significant role of parliament in legislating defense and security matters 
which influence the formulation of national strategy, in contributing transparency 
to decisions concerning defense and security policy; 
• A clear chain of command for the armed forces, with democratically 
elected civilian leaders at its head; 
• The hierarchical responsibility of the military to the government of the day 
through a civilian Minister of Defense – a Ministry or Department of Defense – 
that is charged, as general rule, with the direction / supervision of its activities; 
• Qualified civilians to work with the military in the elaboration of defense 
requirements and the agreement of defense policy and budget; 
• The clear division of professional responsibility between civilian and 
military spheres in such a way that political authority and accountability on the 
one hand, and military professionalism and expertise on the other, are optimized; 
• The subordination of the military General Staff to the civilian Ministry of 
Defense; 
• The presence of a well trained and experienced professional military corps 
that is respected and funded by a civilian authority; 
• A degree of transparency with regard to the defense budget; 
• The effective oversight and scrutiny of parliament. 
These elements of civilian control of armed forces reinforce the primacy of the 
nation state and its national institutions. It is a matter of fact that nation states are 
reluctant to hand over civilian control of armed forces to a supranational organization. 
Most importantly, the accountability for the decision to pursue war or peace is one of the 
core elements of national sovereignty. The only attempt in recent European history to 
create a supranational European Army was in the framework of the European Defense 
Community in the 1950s. This attempt was rejected by the French National Assembly in 
1954. 
The European Union has developed its own institutions, which are in some 
respect comparable with national institutions. Richard Kohn has stated that civilian 
control is based on values and purposes of a nation and on the popular will rather than on 
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the choices of military leaders.58 At the EU level, the European Parliament represents the 
peoples of the European Union. It is the only institution that is directly elected and 
should, therefore, be the institution at the EU level which is in charge of civilian control 
of armed forces. The Council of the European Union, which consists of a representative 
of each member state of the Union at ministerial level, represents the Member States’ 
governments. The Commission is indirectly involved in the CFSP as it only has the right 
to be informed by the Council. Therefore, the principles for civilian control of armed 
forces at the EU level are similar and comparable to that of the nation states: 
• The convention has submitted draft texts of the Articles of the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe59. Article 29 and 30 of this constitution 
deal with the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Defense 
Policy respectively; 
• The newly established Political and Security Committee (PSC), the 
European Union Military Committee (EUMC), and the European Union Military 
Staff (EUMS) have a clear hierarchical order with the subordination of the EUMS 
under the political control of the PSC, especially during a crisis management 
operation; 
• The EUMS, part of the General Secretariat of the Council, is under the 
direction of the Military Committee; 
• The commitment of the Member States of the European Union in 
November 2001 to earmark troops for the “Headline Goals” can be seen as a 
political assurance that only well trained and experienced professional military 
forces will be deployed. Despite the circumstance that these commitments are 
voluntarily, it is a matter of fact that Member States which are asked for troops 
cannot always easily refuse this request. Since the development of the EU’s 
military role in international affairs, the Member States of the European Union 
will only send such troops that are able to conduct and fulfill the missions. The 
                                                 
58 See Chapter Definition of Civilian Control in this paper 
59 “Draft Articles of Articles 1 to 16 of the Constitutional Treaty” and “Draft of Articles 24 to 33 of 
the Constitutional Treaty” Internet Website http://european-
convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/CV00571.EN03.pdf from 31 May 2003 
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deployed troops, therefore, will represent an object of both national and EU 
prestige, that cannot be easily passed by; 
• The annual budget is open to the public, the EP has the right to discharge 
the Commission, and the Court of Auditors submits an annual special report on 
the management of the CFSP; 
• The European Parliament has some rights of oversight and scrutiny, 
especially with respect to the financing of crisis management operations. For that 
reason, the European Parliament has created three standing committees to deal 
with all aspects of the CFSP. The Committee on Foreign Affairs, Humans Rights, 
Common Security and Defense Policy is responsible for matters relating to the 
common foreign and security policy of the European Union, including the task of 
formulation of a common defense and disarmament policy. The tasks of the 
Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Budgetary Control include the 
definition and the exercise of Parliament’s budgetary powers and establishing the 
rules of the EU’s budget. Furthermore, the Committee on Budgetary Control is 
responsible for the control of financial, budgetary and administrative 
implementing measures relating to the general budget of the European Union.60 
 
F. SUMMARY 
The different theoretical frameworks have shown that there is no single concept of 
civilian control. Samuel Huntington divided his theory between subjective and objective 
civilian control and preferred the latter as the maximization of military professionalism. 
Morris Janowitz’s theory of civilian control predicted that armed forces would transform 
into constabulary forces, which have to operate on an international level. Charles Moskos 
sought to link these two concepts and argued that some services of the military forces 
have converged more closely with the political leadership while other services have only 
                                                 
60 See Annex VI of the Rules of Procedures of the European Parliament – The Powers and 
Responsibilities of Standing Committees. Available at Internet Website 
http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/sipade2?PROG=RULES-EP&L=EN&REF=TOC from 31 May 2003 
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a weak relationship. This paper has shown that at the EU level “civilian control” and 
“democratic control” are interchangeable. The reasons are the details in the Treaty on EU 
itself and the necessity for states which apply for EU membership to be democracies. 
With the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU also 
implemented Committees and a Military Staff, which are responsible for its execution. A 
comparison showed how the different theoretical frameworks of civilian control match 
with the political system of the EU. It demonstrated that the concept of civilian control, 
which was developed for nation states, can apply to the political system of the European 
Union. The main aspect regarding civilian control is the responsibility of the institutions, 
which are in charge for the implementation of the CFSP to the respective parliaments. 
Since the European Union is a unique organization, these responsibilities are divided 
between the Member States and the EU itself. 
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III. THE PARLIAMENTARY DIMENSION OF CIVILIAN 
CONTROL 
 
The second pillar of the European Union, the CFSP, is inter-governmentally 
organized. This means that nation states mutually adjust their government policies 
through a process of policy coordination. The main decision makers regarding the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy therefore remain the Member States of the 
European Union. The Headline Goal, which mandates that the EU create its own crisis 
management capacity, does not imply the creation of a standing European army. The 
Member States have to decide whether and how many troops for a crisis management 
mission they will provide. To be democratically legitimized, this decision-making 
process should involve the national parliaments of the Member States. Each member state 
has its own approach to this issue, which makes it necessary to look at the different 
institutions involved in the decision-making process at the national level. Additionally, 
the role of the national parliaments regarding the decision-making process at the EU level 
is based on a declaration annexed to the Maastricht Treaty and a protocol annexed to the 
Amsterdam Treaty. The Declaration No 13 of the Maastricht Treaty reads as follows:61 
The Conference considers that it is important to encourage greater 
involvement of national Parliaments in the activities of the European 
Union. To this end, the exchange of information between the national 
Parliaments and the European Parliament should be stepped up. In this 
context, the governments of the Member States will ensure, inter alia, that 
national Parliaments receive Commission proposals for legislation in good 
time for information or possible examination.  
Similarly, the Conference considers that it is important for contacts 
between the national Parliaments and the European Parliament to be 
stepped up, in particular through the granting of appropriate reciprocal 
facilities and regular meetings between members of Parliament interested 
in the same issues. 
In 1999, after the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force, this declaration was 
amended by a “Protocol on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union”. In 
addition to the availability of legislative proposals as defined above, this protocol added 
                                                 
61 See Declaration No 13 on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union. Internet Website 
http://www.uni-mannheim.de/edz/doku/vertrag/engl/m_final.htm from 31 May 2003 
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that:62 
1. All Commission consultation documents (green and white papers 
and communications) shall be promptly forwarded to national parliaments 
of the Member States; 
3. A six-week period shall elapse between a legislative proposal or a 
proposal for a measure to be adopted under Title VI of the Treaty of the 
European Union being made available in all languages to the European 
Parliament and the Council by the Commission and the date when it is 
placed on a Council agenda for decision either for the adoption of an act or 
for adoption of a common position pursuant to Article 189b or 189c of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community, subject to exceptions on 
grounds of urgency, the reasons for which shall be states in the act or 
common position. 
The following sections will first examine and compare63 those ten EU Member 
States, which have international commitments regarding their NATO membership, then 
the four Member States, which have a neutral or non-aligned status in their international 
relations, and finally review the specific case of Denmark, which despite its NATO 
membership, decided to opt-out in CFSP within the EU framework. The second part of 
the chapter will deal with the tasks of the European Union regarding civilian control of 
armed forces. 
 
A. THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
In Belgium, the constitution stipulates that, ”The king manages international 
relations […] commands the armed forces, and determines the state of war and the 
cessation of hostilities.”64. Since national defense is a matter for the executive, 
parliamentary scrutiny is exercised retrospectively by the two chambers, the House of 
Representatives and the Senate. The final decision is taken by the House of 
                                                 
62 See Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union Point I: Information for 
national parliaments of member states. Internet Website http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/treaties/dat/ams_treaty_en.pdf from 31 May 2003 
63 For greater detail to this comparison, see Assembly of Western European Union Document C/1762 
National parliamentary scrutiny of intervention abroad by armed forces engaged in international missions: 
the current position of law Internet Website http://www.assembly-
weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2001/1762.pdf from 31 May 2003 
64 See Article 167 of the Constitution of Belgium. Internet Website 
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/be00000_.html from 31 May 2003 
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Representatives alone. For deployment of Belgian troops abroad, no authorization of the 
parliament is required. 
The constitution of France, from 28 September 1958, sees the president as the 
“guarantor of the national independence, the integrity of the territory, and of observance 
of Community agreement.”65 He is also Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.66 
Regarding the decision to deploy military troops to peace keeping operations, the 
President is the institution of authorization, but only if he can declare this deployment 
necessary because of a threat to the nation or the state of emergency. If not, then Article 
16 of the constitution states:67 
(1) When the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the 
nation, the integrity of its territory, or the fulfillment of its international 
commitments are under grave and immediate threat and when the proper 
functioning of the constitutional governmental authorities is interrupted, 
the President of the Republic shall take the measures demanded by these 
circumstances after official consultation with the Prime Minister, the 
Presidents of the Assemblies, and the Constitutional Council; 
(2) He shall inform the nation of these measures by a message. 
Nevertheless, some Members of the Parliament complain that “deployment of 
French forces abroad occurs in the majority of cases without any form of parliamentary 
scrutiny being exercised.”68 
In Germany, the parliament has to approve in general a deployment of military 
forces, in other cases than in a state of defense. In the decision of the Constitutional Court 
from 12 July 1994, the court expressed that a decision for a mission outside the country is 
made under a constitutive reservation of the parliament (konstitutiver 
Parlamentsvorbehalt).69 This means, that in case of a deployment of military personnel 
                                                 
65 See Article 5 (2) of the Constitution of France. Internet Website 
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/fr00000_.html from 31 May 2003 
66 See Article 15 of the Constitution of France 
67 See Article 16 of the Constitution of France 
68 So Francois Lamy, quoted in Assembly of the WEU Document C/1762, p. 11 
69 quoted in Siedschlag, Alexander: National decision-making processes for military mission within 
the framework of the Petersberg-Tasks of the EU – Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Sweden 
(Nationale Entscheidugnsprozess bei Streitkraefteeinsaetzen im Rahmen der Petersberg-Aufgaben der EU – 
Deutschland, Frankreich, Grossbritannien, Italien, Schweden) in: Reiter, Erich / Rummel Reinhardt / 
Schmidt, Peter (Ed.): Europe’s remote military forces. EU’s chances and difficulties of the development of 
the ESDP (Europas ferne Streitmacht. Chancen und Schwieirgkeiten der Europaeischen Union beim 
Aufbau der ESVP)  
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abroad, an approval of the House of Representatives (Bundestag) is necessary in advance. 
Furthermore, the House of Representatives has to agree to a prolongation or enhancement 
of the mission. Additionally, the House of Representatives has no right of initiative, 
which means it can not force a deployment of military forces against the will of the 
government. The Defense Committee of the House of Representatives is permitted to 
consider any defense related matter, including of its own motion, and can turn itself into a 
committee of inquiry. For the national dimension of civilian control of armed forces, 
there is a Parliamentary Commissioner (Wehrbeauftragter des Deutschen Bundestag) for 
the armed forces, who is a kind of mediator elected for a five-year term. The legal basis 
for this institution is the Law of the Parliamentary Commissioner of the House of 
Representatives (Gesetz über den Wehrbeauftragten des Deutschen Bundestages).70 
Paragraph 1 states the responsibility for parliamentary control. According to Paragraph 2, 
he or she has to report annually to the House of Representatives. This report is made 
available to the general public. 
In Greece, the Council of Ministers has competence of the decision to deploy 
military troops within the framework of the country’s obligations under international 
agreements. 
Regarding Italy’s constitution, the president is the commander of the armed 
forces and the chairman of the Supreme Defense Council. Formally, there is no 
obligation to consult the parliament before the deployment of troops abroad, but the 
constitution states in Article 11 a “repudiation of war as an instrument of offence against 
the liberty of other peoples and as a means for settling international disputes.”71 Political 
practice shows, that the government automatically consults the Chamber of Deputies72. 
On 16 January 2001, Parliament and the Defense Committee approved a resolution 
describing the decision-making process for the deployment of military contingents abroad 
as follows:73 
                                                 
70 Available at Internet Website 
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/gesetze/BJNR006520957/navigation.html from 31 May 2003 (in 
German) 
71 See Article 11 of the Constitution of Italy. Internet Website 
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/it00000_.html from 31 May 2003 
72 See Siedschlag Alexander, p. 229 
73 quoted in Assembly of WEU Document C/1762, p. 13 
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[…] 
3. The Government deliberates on any involvement in missions 
abroad and reports immediately to Parliament; 
4. Parliament – both chambers or one only, or the relevant 
parliamentary committees – approves, on the basis of government 
communications on the unfolding of the crisis and any initiatives taken – 
the decision taken, within a time limit compatible with the international 
undertakings given; 
5. Once Parliament has taken its stance, the Government may either 
(a) enact by decree the accompanying financial arrangements for the 
approved measures or (b) lay down draft legislation with the same content 
before Parliament; 
6. The Minister for Defense carries out the decisions adopted by 
government by giving instructions to the Joint Chief of Staff. 
The Italian government is obliged to submit to both Chambers a decree defining 
the scope and nature of the Italian contribution to a military mission abroad. The 
involvement of the parliament encompasses especially the approval of the funding of 
such a mission. 
In Luxemburg, each peacekeeping mission requires the drafting of a “Grand 
Duchy regulation” with compulsory consultation of the Council of State and Conference 
of Presidents of the Chamber of Deputies. Additionally, the decision to participate in 
multinational missions abroad is made by the Government meeting in Council, after 
having consulted with the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committees of the Chamber of 
the Deputies. 
Netherlands’ constitution expresses in Article 100:74 
The Government shall provide Parliament with information in advance on 
the posting or making available of the armed forces for the maintenance or 
promotion of the international legal order, including information on the 
posting or making available of the armed forces for the provision of 
humanitarian assistance in the case of armed conflict. 
This provision does not automatically constitute a formal right of assent of the 
Dutch Parliament but “it does mean that Parliament has a substantive right of assent in 
                                                 
74 See Assembly of WEU Document C/1762, p. The new Constitution of the year 2000 is available in 
Dutch at Internet Website http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nederlandse_Grondwet from 31 May 2003 
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practice. The Government would never post Dutch military personnel abroad without the 
assent of a (large) majority in Parliament.”75 
In Portugal, the Assembly of the Republic has, according to Article 163 (j) of the 
constitution, the power “to monitor, in accordance with the law and Standing Orders, the 
involvement of Portuguese military contingents abroad.”76 
In Spain, the case of military operations in the framework of an international 
mission is not explicitly provided for by law but forms part of the foreign policy 
responsibilities of Government. The Council of Ministers makes the formal decision to 
authorize the participation of Spanish military units in humanitarian and peacekeeping 
missions. Such decisions are based on proposals from the Defense and Foreign Affairs 
Ministries. In regards to the Assembly of the WEU report, the government has always 
acted on its own initiative, but its decisions are accompanied by a parliamentary debate, 
almost always after the event, without the adoption of instruments binding on the 
Government in regard to the measures adopted. 
In the United Kingdom, deployment of British troops and the issuing of orders to 
engage in hostilities are regarded as matters of Royal Prerogative, exercised by the 
monarch and his/her ministers of the Cabinet. This division of responsibility goes back to 
William III in 1688. In this respect, Hew Strachan notes that this division was 
accomplished by “vesting the command of the army in military officers responsible to the 
crown and […] vesting the administration of the army in civil ministers responsible to the 
parliament.”77 Nowadays this responsibility is executed less by the respective ministers 
and more by the Prime Minister himself. As a result, the executive dominates the British 
foreign policy process, more than any other policy area. The British Parliament plays a 
comparatively minor role in foreign affairs. Norrin N. Ripsman78 identifies three 
considerations which prevent the British Parliament from achieving a major role in 
foreign policy making. First, since the British system is adversarial in nature, Parliament 
                                                 
75 See WEU Assembly Documents C/1762, p. 14 
76 See Article 163 (j) of the Constitution of Portugal Internet Website 
http://www.parlamento.pt/ingles/cons_leg/crp_ing/index.html from 31 May 2003 
77 See Strachan, Hew, p 44 
78 See Ripsman, Norrin N.: Domestic Structures and Democratic Foreign Policy. Peacemaking After 
World War II. Internet Website http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/rin01/ from 31 May 2003 
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is rigidly divided into Government and Opposition. Second, the Cabinet is able to keep 
vital information confidential. Third, it is prevailing norm that foreign security policy 
ought to be left to the Cabinet. Therefore, parliamentary control is restricted to funding.79 
Nevertheless, this control is limited by the fact that the parliament does not decide about 
single expenditures but about the entire defense budget. In the words of Hew Strachan, 
“during the course of the last century, and particularly since 1945, the army’s 
subordination to parliament has become a constitutional figment rather than a practicing 
reality. The role of the House of Common has been largely passive.”80 
In Austria, according to Article 80 (1) of the constitution, the Federal President is 
Commander-in-Chief of the Federal Army. The Federal Minister exercises supreme 
command over the Federal Army.81 In 1997, the government passed a law regarding the 
deployment of military personnel abroad.82 Article 2 (1) states that the government, in 
agreement with the Main Committee of the Parliament, is responsible for the deployment 
of military troops in the case of a measure to promote peace within the framework of an 
international organization or the OSCE, or in execution of a decision in the framework of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Parliamentary participation concerning EU 
matters is laid down in the Austrian Federal Constitution, in Article 23a to 23f. Normally, 
Austria’s Parliament is informed without delay by the Minister about all projects within 
the framework of the European Union.83 Its Main Committee and Standing Committee on 
European Affairs respectively, have the possibility to present opinions to the respective 
Federal Minister. These opinions are legally, as well as politically, binding84 and can be 
presented on issues falling into all three pillars of EU law. The respective Federal 
                                                 
79 See Siedschlag, Alexander, p. 28 
80 See Strachan Hew, p. 265f 
81 See Article 80 (3) of the Constitution of Austria. Internet Website 
http://www.parlament.gv.at/pd/gesetze/b-vg/default.html from 31 May 2003 (in German) 
82 Constitutional Law of Cooperation and Solidarity for the Ddeployment of Units and Personnel 
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http://www.bmlv.gv.at/download_archiv/pdfs/gesetze/auslandseinsatzrecht.pdf from 31 May 2003 
83 See Article 23e (1) of the Constitution of Austria 
84 See Hegeland, Hans and Neuhold, Christine: Parliamentary participation in EU affairs in Austria, 
Finland and Sweden: Newcomers with different approaches European Online Papers Vol 6 (2002) N° 10. 
Internet Website http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2002-010.pdf from 31 May 2003 
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Minister is only allowed to depart from such a binding opinion in the case of “compelling 
reasons of foreign and integration policy.”85  
Finland’s involvement in international peacekeeping missions is based on her 
own law. The “Act on Peace Support Operations 2000”86 organizes in Chapter 1 the 
participation of Finland in military crisis management and peace support operations. 
According to Section 1, Finland will participate only within the framework of a UN or 
OSCE mandate. Section 2 of Chapter 1 deals with the decision on participation; it reads: 
On the proposal of the Government, the President of the Republic shall 
decide on Finland’s participation in peacekeeping activities and on the 
termination of participation, in each case separately. Before introducing 
the proposal to deploy a peacekeeping force, the Government shall consult 
the Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament. Furthermore, the 
Government shall consult the Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament if 
major changes are planned in the tasks of the Finnish forces. 
If the rules of engagement of the peacekeeping force are planned to be 
wider than in traditional peacekeeping, the Government must consult 
Parliament by submitting a report detailing the rules of engagement in the 
operation in question prior to introducing the proposal. The procedure 
shall be the same if a widening of the rules of engagement of the 
peacekeeping force is planned during the peacekeeping operation. 
Ireland’s constitution states, “The supreme command of the Defense Forces is 
hereby vested in the President.”87 The development of the CFSP and the participation of 
Ireland respectively do not affect the military neutrality of the country.88 As Ireland is 
committed to a “devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly co-operation amongst nations 
founded on international justice and morality”89, each new treaty of the EU or a change 
in the CFSP affecting Ireland’s neutrality must be approved by a referendum.90 This led 
to a referendum on 19 October 2002 and an amendment of the constitution, which states 
                                                 
85 Article 23e (2) of the Constitution of Austria; last sentence 
86 Available at Internet Website http://www.finlex.fi/pdf/saadkaan/E9840514.PDF from 31 May 2003 
87 See Article 13.4 of the Constitution of Ireland. Internet Website 
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/upload/publications/297.htm from 31 May 2003 
88 See White Paper on Defense February 2000. Internet Website 
http://www.defence.ie/website.nsf/0/4C65ACD916F7E50180256C5A0055BCB3/$file/whiteppr.pdf from 
31 May 2003, p. 20 
89 See Article 29 (1) of the Constitution of Ireland which defines thereof the country’s military 
neutrality 
90 See Article 47 of the Constitution of Ireland 
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“the State shall not adopt a decision taken by the European Council to establish a 
common defence pursuant to Article 1.2 of the Treaty [of Nice][…]”91 
Sweden’s constitution talks about the deployment of military forces in Chapter 10 
“Relations with other States” Article 9. It reads:92 
(1) The Government may commit the country's defense forces, or any 
part of them, to battle in order to repel an armed attack upon the Realm. 
Swedish armed forces may otherwise be committed to battle or sent to 
another country only if 
1) The Parliament has assented thereto;  
2) It is permitted under a law which sets out the prerequisites 
for such action;  
3) An obligation to take such action follows from an 
international agreement or obligation which has been approved 
by the Parliament; 
(2) No declaration of war may be made without the consent of the 
Parliament, except in the event of an armed attack against Sweden; 
(3) The Government may authorize the defense forces to use force in 
accordance with international law and custom to prevent a violation of 
Swedish soil in time of peace or during a war between foreign states.  
This last point authorizes Swedish armed forces to be deployed under article 43 of the 
UN Charter.93 
In addition, there are two laws authorizing the Government to send armed forces 
abroad.94 The first is the “Act on Armed Forces on Duty Abroad”, which authorizes the 
government to make armed forces available for peacekeeping activities by request of the 
United Nations or according to decisions made by the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This force may not exceed 3,000 persons serving abroad 
                                                 
91 See Article 29 (9) of the Constitution of Ireland 
92 See the Constitution of Sweden. Internet Website http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/sw00000_.html 
from 31 May 2003 
93 Article 43 (1) reads: All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenances 
of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in 
accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights 
of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Charta of the United 
Nations available at Internet Website http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/contents.html from 31 May 
2003 
94 quoted from Assembly of Western European Union Document A/1762, p. 19 
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at the same time. However, this law is only applicable to peacekeeping – not to peace-
enforcement activities. The second act is the “Act on Training for Peace-promoting 
Activities”. This act enables the government to send armed forces abroad to participate in 
training for peace-promoting activities within the framework of international cooperation.  
Denmark is a special case because of the Danish opt-out on defense at EU level. 
This opting-out of defense within the European Union is based on Protocol No 5 of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. The means that Denmark does not participate in the elaboration 
and implementation of decisions and actions of the Union that have defense implications. 
Nevertheless, it will not prevent the development of closer cooperation between Member 
States of the EU in this area. 
 
B. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
The most important institution to deal with civilian control of armed forces should 
be the European Parliament. It consists, at present, of 626 parliamentarians who are 
elected by direct universal suffrage from the peoples of the European Union. Therefore, it 
is the only institution which represents directly the European citizen at the EU level. The 
European Parliament is involved in the CFSP via Article 21 on TEU:95 
The Presidency shall consult the European Parliament on the main aspects 
and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and shall 
ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into 
consideration. The European Parliament shall be kept regularly informed 
by the Presidency and the Commission of the development of the Union’s 
foreign and security policy. 
The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make 
recommendations to it. It shall hold an annual debate on progress in 
implementing the common foreign and security policy. 
Chapter XI of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament deals with 
international agreements, external representation of the Union and Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. Rule 101 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament refers to 
the cooperation between the European Parliament and the High Representative. It 
states:96 
                                                 
95 See Article 21 TEU  
96 See Rule 101 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament 
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(1) The High Representative shall be invited to make statements in 
Parliament at least four times a year. Rule 37 shall apply; 
(2) The High Representative shall be invited at least four times a year 
to attend meetings of the committee responsible in order to make a 
statement and answer questions. The High Representative may also be 
invited on other occasions, whenever the committee considers this to be 
necessary, or at his initiative; 
(3) Whenever a special representative is appointed by the Council with 
a mandate in relation to particular policy issues, he may be invited to make 
a statement to the committee responsible, at Parliament's or at his 
initiative. 
Furthermore, the European Parliament created a standing committee, the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Humans Rights, Common Security and Defense Policy. 
This committee is, with regard to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, responsible 
for matters relating to:97 
(1) the common foreign and security policy of the European Union, 
including the task of formulating a common defense and disarmament 
policy (Article 11 of the EU Treaty); 
(2) relations with the other institutions in the foreign policy sphere, 
and in particular with the High Representative for the common foreign and 
security policy; 
(3) political aspects of relations with third countries and international 
organizations with regard to the implementation of the Union’s foreign 
and security policy. 
For the relations with the national parliaments, rule 55 (1) states “Parliament shall 
keep the national parliaments of the Member States regularly informed of its activities.” 
Beside the general involvement of the EP in all aspects of the CFSP (which convenes for 
an annual debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy) 
and the cooperation with the High Representative, further factors are necessary in order 
to implement an effective civilian control of armed forces. These factors of civilian 
control of armed forces are budgetary power and access to information, particularly 
access to classified material.  
 
                                                 
97 See Annex VI of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament – The Powers and 
Responsibilities of Standing Committees. Point I 
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 1. Budgetary Power 
According to Article 276 (1) of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community,98 the EP possesses the right to discharge the Commission the annual budget 
of the European Union. Annex V of the Rules of Procedure deals with the procedure for 
the consideration and adoption of decisions on the granting of discharge. In order to 
fulfill this part of civilian control, the European Parliament has established two standing 
committees. These committees are the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on 
Budgetary Control. The tasks of the Committee on Budgets are also annexed to the Rules 






                                                
The definition and exercise of Parliament's budgetary powers 
(Articles 268 to 273 of the EC Treaty) and the rules thereof dealing with 
establishment of the budget; 
The budgets of the European Union, including the ECSC budget 
and of the European Development Fund; 
The multi-annual estimates of the Union’s revenue and expenditure 
and the inter-institutional agreements concluded in these matters and the 
implementation of budgetary conciliation; 
Financial resources of the Union […]. 
 
The Committee on Budgetary Control is responsible for:100 
(1) The control of financial, budgetary and administrative 
implementing measures relating to the general budget of the European 
Union; 
(2) The control of the financial and administrative activities of the 
European Coal and Steal Community and the financial activities of the 
European Investment Bank carried out on the basis of instructions from 
the Commission; 
(3) The Financial Regulation in connection with matters relating to the 
implementation, management and control of budgets; 
(4) The decisions on discharge taken by Parliament and measures 
accompanying or implementing such decisions. 
 
98 Consolidated Version of the Treaty establishing the European Community (24 December 2002) is 
available at Internet Website http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/EC_consol.pdf from 31 May 2003 
99 See Annex VI of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament Point II 
100 See Annex VI of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament Point III 
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Regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy, budgetary power of the EP is 
determined in Article 28 of the TEU. It states:101 
[…] 
(2) Administrative expenditure which the provisions relating to the 
areas referred to in this Title entail for the institutions, shall be charged to 
the budget of the European Communities; 
(3) Operational expenditure, to which the implementation of those 
provisions gives rise, shall also be charged to the budget of the European 
Communities, except for such expenditure arising from operations having 
military or defense implications and cases where the Council acting 
unanimously decides otherwise. 
To make the procedure of the budgetary power easier for all institutions involved, 
not only in CFSP, but also in all three pillars of the EU, the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission adopted on 6 May 1999 an Interinstitutional Agreement on 
budgetary discipline and improvement of the budgetary procedure.102 
 
 2. Access to Relevant Information 
The other key issue of civilian control is access to relevant classified information. 
In general, consultation of and provision of information to the European Parliament 
within the framework of the CFSP is explained in rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure: 
(1) 
(2) 
                                                
Where Parliament is consulted pursuant to Article 21 of the EU 
Treaty, the matter shall be referred to the committee responsible which 
may make recommendations pursuant to Rule 104;103 
The committees concerned shall seek to ensure that the High 
Representative for the common foreign and security policy, the Council 
and the Commission provide them with regular and timely information on 
the development and implementation of the Union's common foreign and 
security policy, on the costs envisaged each time that a decision entailing 
expenditure is adopted under that policy, and on any other financial 
considerations relating to the implementation of actions under that policy. 
Exceptionally, at the request of the Commission, the Council or the High 
Representative, a committee may decide to hold its proceedings in camera; 
 
101 See Article 28 TEU 
102 EU Document 1999/C 172/01 Internet Website http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/1999/c_172/c_17219990618en00010022.pdf from 31 May 2003 
103 Rule 104 states that the committee responsible for the common foreign and security policy may 
draw up recommendations to the Council in its areas of responsibility after obtaining authorization from the 




                                                
An annual debate shall be held on the consultative document 
established by the Council on the main aspects and basic choices of the 
common foreign and security policy, including the financial implications 
for the Union budget […]; 
The Council and/or the High Representative and the Commission 
shall be invited to each plenary debate that involves either foreign, 
security or defense policy. 
The general agreement on public access to Council documents stems from 1993. 
With the development of its own military crisis management capabilities and particularly 
close cooperation with NATO, the Council of the EU amended this agreement and 
restricted public access to Council documents. This refers to documents that are 
“classified as top secret, secret, or confidential […] on matters concerning the security 
and defense of the Union or of one or more of its Member States or on military or non-
military crisis management.”104 In this respect, Frederik Jensen stated, that NATO has 
“require[d] that the EU develop a means to limit the number of eyes that have access to 
some military secrets to a number less than 15, i.e., excluding access of some of the EU 
Member States.”105 This paragraph likely refers to the four neutral and non-aligned 
Member States of the European Union that are not members of NATO. Regarding the 
Presidency Conclusion in Copenhagen in December 2002, the future EU Member States, 
Cyprus and Malta, both not members of the NATO Partnership for Peace Program, will 
have access only to classified information that “does not contain or refer to any classified 
NATO information.”106 Jensen also noted that the Council had failed to satisfy the EP 
with promises of privileged access to information. That shortcoming was remedied on 20 
November 2002, when the European Parliament signed an Interinstitutional Agreement 
between the EP and the Council concerning access by the EP to sensitive information of 
the Council in the field of security and defense policy. Point 2.2. of this agreement reads: 
At the request of one of the persons referred to in point 3.1. below, the 
Presidency of the Council or the Secretary-General/High Representative 
 
104 See Council Decision amending Decision 93/731/EC on public access to Council documents. new 
Article 1 (1) Internet Website http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/00/st10/10702en0.pdf from 31 May 
2003 
105 See Jensen, Frederik: Military secrecy in the EU Council provokes legal challenges. European 
Security Review No 2, Internet Website http://www.isis-europe.org/isiseu/esreview/2000/oct2000.pdf from 
31 May 2003, p. 1 
106 See Annex II of the Presidency Conclusion – European Council Meeting in Copenhagen 12 and 13 
December 2002 Internet Website http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf from 31 May 2003 
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shall inform them with all due dispatch of the content of the powers 
conferred on the European Parliament by the Treaty on European Union in 
the field covered by the present Interinstitutional Agreement, taking into 
account the public interest in matters relating to the security and defense 
of the European Union or of one or more of its Member States or military 
and non-military crisis management, in accordance with the arrangements 
laid down on section 3 below. 
This agreement allows a Special Committee, which is “chaired by the Chairman 
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defense 
Policy and composed of four members designated by the Conference of Presidents”107 
access to restricted information.  
 
C. SUMMARY 
Full involvement of the national parliaments in the decision-making process for 
the deployment of armed forces abroad is only established in two Member States – 
Germany and the Netherlands – and with some respect in Austria. Within the other 
Member States it is carried out by other divisions of responsibility. As stated in Chapter 
II, the definition of civilian control of armed forces is the subordination of the military 
under democratically elected authorities. This means that in most of the Member States of 
the European Union, civilian control of armed forces is exercised in such a way that the 
parliaments are able to scrutinize the executives. The problem is not only a limited 
legitimacy, since the executive is not directly elected, but also “that even when national 
parliaments were given the power to scrutinize the action of their governments, they are 
not always making full use of it.”108 
The involvement of the European Parliament in civilian control of armed forces at 
the EU level is relatively weak. It encompasses the right to be consulted by the 
presidency and the Commission and the right to ask questions or make recommendations 
to the Council. Additionally, the High Representative is required to make statements in 
the European Parliament at least four times a year. The Parliament exercises its scrutiny 
via three committees – the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Humans Rights, Common 
                                                 
107 Point 3.3. of the Interinstitutional Agreement Internet Website http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/c_298/c_29820021130en00010003.pdf from 31 May 2003 
108 See Working Group IV – Final Report on the role of the national parliaments. Point 11. Internet 
Website http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cv00/00353en2.pdf from 31 May 2003 
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Security and Defense Policy, the Committee on Budgets, and the Committee on 
Budgetary Control. Access to relevant information is also limited as only a Special 
Committee has access to restricted information. 
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IV. CHALLENGES FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
As described in the previous chapter, in the last four years the European Union 
developed institutions and mechanisms for crisis response. Nevertheless, the political 
leaders realized that there is still a lack of democratic legitimacy and transparency in the 
Union and its institutions. Therefore both the Nice Treaty, which entered into force on 1 
February 2003, and the conclusions of the European Council at Laeken referred to this 
issue. The Treaty of Nice states in Point 6 of its Declaration No 23 of the future of the 
Union “[…] the Conference recognizes the need to improve and to monitor the 
democratic legitimacy and transparency of the Union and its institutions, in order to bring 
them closer to the citizen of the Member States.”109 The Heads of State and Government 
agreed in Laeken to convene a Convention, which has to deal with the future of 
Europe.110 However, because of the mentioned lack of democratic legitimacy and 
transparency, and beside the work of the European Convention, the European Union still 
faces some challenges regarding an effective civilian control of armed forces in the 
European Union. These challenges are, among others: 
• Weak involvement of the national parliaments; 
• Restricted access to classified information for both the national 
parliaments and the European Parliament; 
• Restricted rights of oversight and scrutiny of the European Parliament; 
• Different security status of the Member States of the EU. 
 
A. WEAK INVOLVEMENT OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS 
The involvement of national parliaments in CFSP is relatively weak. A first 
reason is the role of the national parliaments concerning the decision of deployment of 
military troops. As mentioned in Chapter II, only two parliaments of the Member States 
of the European Union are involved in the particular decision making process. For the 
                                                 
109 See Treaty of Nice Internet Website http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/nice_treaty_en.pdf 
from 31 May 2003  
110 See Annex I of the Presidency Conclusion – European Council Meeting in Laeken 14 and 15 
December 2001, Internet Website http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/ec/68827.pdf from 31 May 2003 
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other Member States, parliamentary approval is in retrospective. One question, which 
should be answered by the Convention, is “how should the role of the national 
parliaments regarding democratic legitimacy be defined?”111 In its final report, “The role 
of national parliaments,” Working Group IV of the Convention acknowledged that “even 
when national parliaments were given the power to scrutinize the actions of their 
governments, they were not always making full use of it.”112 Nevertheless, despite the 
fact of different systems for national parliamentary scrutiny, most of the governments of 
the EU Member States agreed that scrutiny of CFSP will, in the near future, remain the 
role of national parliaments. In this respect, the quotations range from “the national 
parliaments will have a crucial role to play in proper parliamentary scrutiny of security 
and defense decisions”113 together with, “given the Euro-governmental nature of CFSP, it 
is not yet possible to talk of scrutiny in the strictly sense, other than by the national 
parliaments”114 to “[…] it is right, that primary responsibility for scrutinizing ESDP 
should lie with national parliaments.”115 In addition, it seems that, by and large, the 
Member States assess the retrospective approval of their governments’ decisions as 
sufficient. Only the Defense Committee of the French National Assembly proposed a 
new wording of its Article 35 of the French Constitution: 116 
The deployment of French armed forces outside the national 
territory shall be subject to the prior consultation of Parliament according 
to conditions laid down by an institutional act. The participation of such 
forces in peacekeeping, peacemaking or peace enforcement operations that 
are not the express subject of a decision by the United Nations Security 
Council or which do not result from the application of a defense 
agreement shall be subject to the prior authorization of Parliament. 
The second reason for the weak involvement of the national parliaments in ESDP 
and parliamentary scrutiny is their lack of information. As the report of the Assembly of 
                                                 
111 ibid 
112 See Working Group IV – Final Report on the ole of the national parliaments, Point 11 
113 Luxemburg’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Mrs. Polfer on 17 January 2002, quoted in Assembly of 
Western European Union, Document A/1780, Internet Website http://www.assembly-
weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2002/1780.pdf from 31 May 2003, Point 7 
114 Spanish’ Defense Minister Trillo-Figueroa y Martinez-Conde on 6 February 2002, quoted in 
Assembly of Western European Union, Document A/1780, Point 9 
115 UK’s Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Mr. Bradshaw on behalf of the Foreign Secretary, 
quoted in Assembly of Western European Union, Document A/1780, Point 11 
116 Quoted in Western European Union, Document A/1780, Point 17 
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Western European Union about the parliamentary dimension of the ESDP states, “[…] as 
far as ESDP issues are concerned, each government informs parliament on a bilateral 
basis only. The only way national parliaments come to hear directly about the opinion-
forming process in, and perceptions of, the other governments and parliaments is through 
occasional contacts with them on an individual basis.”117 The main problem that exists is 
this respect is described best by the Assembly of Western European Union in its 
contribution to the Convention regarding the role of national parliaments in the EU: 
“Each national parliament is required to give its views on the budget contributions of its 
country to any EU-led military operations and on the deployment of troops for such 
operations, without having direct access to information about the decision-making 
process at European level.”118 
On 14 May 2001, the Dutch Parliament organized in The Hague a seminar on the 
parliamentary dimension of the ESDP. Five different options to deal with the lack of 
information were discussed:119 
1. Full competence for the European Parliament in the second as well 
as in the first pillar of the EU […]; 
2. Creation of a mixed Assembly, with the 15 EU states as full 
members but meeting at 28120 and including both national 
parliamentarians and a sufficient number of members of the 
European Parliament; 
3. Continuation of the present practice of the European Parliament 
under Article 21 and leave the ESDP entirely to the WEU 
Assembly in its present form; 
                                                 
117 See Assembly of Western European Union, Document A/1752, Internet Website 
http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2001/1752.pdf from 31 May 2003, 
Point 9 
118 See Assembly of Western European Union, Document A/1778, Internet Website 
http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2002/1778.pdf from 31 May 2003, 
Point 79  
119 ibid, Point 14 
120 The “28” means all Member States, Associate Members, Associate Partners, and Observers of the 
Western European Union 
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4. Meetings of national delegations to be informed by the country 
holding the Presidency (the COSAC121 model but consisting of 
members of standing committees for defense and foreign affairs); 
5. No multinational oversight at all. 
The debate focused especially on options 2 and 3 because “a large majority of the 
participants did not think a COSAC-type arrangement as described in option 4 would be 
appropriate for making good the democratic deficit that exists under the ESDP.”122 On 
the contrary, both of the final reports of Working Group IV, “The Role of the National 
Parliaments” and Working Group VIII, “Defense”, preferred a COSAC like model. 
Working Group IV agreed in its final report that “a more systematic exchange of 
information between national parliaments about methods and experiences could play an 
essential role in increasing knowledge and awareness of European affairs and thus 
improve further the efficiency of national parliamentary scrutiny.”123 Parliamentary 
scrutiny of security and defense policy is exercised according to the final report of 
Working Group VIII, by the European Parliament and the national parliaments. The latter 
are recommended to organize regular meetings of the relevant committees to ensure 
better exchanges of information and more effective political scrutiny.124 To coordinate 
the viewpoints of the national parliaments and the European Parliament, the EP proposed 
bi-annual regular meetings between the Competent Committee of the European 
Parliament and representatives of the respective committees of national parliaments.125 
The same proposal came from Working Group VII, “External Relations”. The group 
                                                 
121 COSAC is the French abbreviation of the Conference of the Community and European Affairs 
Committees of Parliaments of the EU – “Conférence des organs specialisés dans les affaires 
communautaires”. This Conference is a convention of members of the national parliaments as well as the 
European Parliament at least once each presidency. COSAC enables a regular exchange of views, without 
prejudicing the competencies of the parliamentary bodies of the European Union. 
122 See Western European Union, Document A/1752, Point 15 
123 See Working Group IV – Final Report on the role of the national parliaments, Point 11 
124 See Working Group VIII – Defense, Final report, Internet Website 
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cv00/00461en2.pdf from 31 May 2003, Point 73 
125 See Report of the European Parliament on the new European Security and defense architecture – 
priorities and deficiencies. Internet Website http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/sipade2?PUBREF=-
//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-2003-
0111+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&L=EN&LEVEL=2&NAV=S&LSTDOC=Y from 31 May 2003, Point 58 
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agreed that “regular exchanges of views between the European Parliament and national 
parliaments on CFSP issues should be ensured.”126 
 
B. ACCESS TO RELEVANT INFORMATION 
The second challenge the European Union faces regarding an effective civilian 
control of armed forces is the restricted access to classified information. The national 
parliaments are excluded from this access, at least at the European Union level. The 
possibility for the national parliaments lies mainly in the establishment or convention of a 
committee of inquiry to scrutinize decisions from the national executive. Another means 
of control is the budgetary process executed by the Member States of the EU, which 
oversees the financing of crisis management operations. But as mentioned before, the 
main obstacle remains the lack of information to the national parliaments. 
At EU level, the European Parliament and the Council approved a new agreement 
on 20 November 2002, to get access to sensitive information, but there remain some 
points of criticism. One point of criticism is that this access is only granted to the 
members of a certain committee. These members are not authorized to share Top Secret 
information with other members of the European Parliament127 or in the framework of 
COSAC with the representatives of the national parliaments. In addition, sharing other 
confidential or secret information is also restricted to four options:128 
1. information intended for the chairman of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defense 
Policy; 
2. access to information restricted to the members of the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defense 
Policy only; 
3. discussion in the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, 
Common Security and Defense Policy, meeting in camera, in 
accordance with arrangements which may vary by virtue of the 
degree of confidentiality involved; 
4. communication of documents from which information has been 
expunged in the light of the degree of secrecy required. 
                                                 
126 See Working Group VII – External Action, Final report, Internet Website 
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cv00/00459en2.pdf from 31 May 2003, Point 60 
127 See Point 3.3. of the Interinstitutional Agreement 
128 ibid 
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As Malin Tappert states, “Effective parliamentary scrutiny of ESDP would 
require that this committee parliament [sic] has sufficient expertise to process and assess 
the information it is provided with.”129 At least for Top Secret information, despite the 
expertise of the five members of the special committee, this conclusion is doubtable. 
Another point of criticism is that “information originating from a third State or 
international organization shall be transmitted with the agreement of that State or 
organization.”130 This results in an extensive veto power for third parties. 
To increase the amount of information available for the European Parliament, it 
required in its “Report on the progress achieved in the implementation of the common 
foreign and security policy” from 11 September 2002 that “the Council presidency […] 
should be answerable on writing on the basis of specific recommendations by the 
Parliament, notably in questions of security and defense policy.”131 
 
C. OVERSIGHT AND SCRUTINY OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
As shown in Chapter II, the right of parliamentary oversight and scrutiny is 
limited for the European Parliament. There are weak consultation obligations according 
to Article 21 of the TEU and some budgetary powers according to Article 28 of the TEU. 
Article 21 states that the Presidency shall consult the European Parliament on the 
main aspects and the main choices of the common foreign and security policy. However, 
the main actors of the CFSP are the Member States and at EU level the European 
Council, which defines the principles of and the general guidelines for the CFSP. The 
Presidency is, according to Article 18 (2), only responsible for the implementation of the 
decision taken under Title V of the Treaty of the European Union. Therefore, the 
European Parliament can only address the institution which is responsible for the 
                                                 
129 Tappert, Malin: European Parliament resigned to limited oversight of ESDP? European Security 
Review Number 16, Internet Website http://www.isis-europe.org/isiseu/esreview/2003/ESR16.pdf from 31 
May 2003 p. 9 
130 Point 1.2. of the Interinstitutional Agreement 
131 See Report of the European Parliament on the progress achieved in the implementation of the 
common foreign and security policy. Internet Website 
http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/sipade2?PUBREF=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-2002-
0296+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&L=EN&LEVEL=3&NAV=S&LSTDOC=Y from 31 May 2003, page 24  
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execution of decisions in CFSP, but not the institution which decides at the EU level. The 
“Draft Articles on external action in the Constitutional Treaty”, which were presented by 
the Convention on 23 April 2003, slightly changed the wording of Article 21. It now 
states that, “The European Parliament shall be consulted […].”132 Nevertheless, the 
comments to this article make a reference to the final report of Working Group VII 
External Action. The Working Group’s conclusion was that “The Working Group 
recognized that the current provisions of Art. 21 TEU relating to CFSP were 
satisfactory.”133 
Article 13 (1) of Part II – Title B clarifies to whom this obligation of consultation 
is addressed. It states “The Minister for Foreign Affairs shall consult the European 
Parliament […].” The comment to this article states that “The Working Group recognized 
that the current provisions of Article 21 TEU were satisfactory, but that they should, 
however, be supplemented to include the participation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
in the tasks described in Article 21 TEU.” The new wording of Article 13 (1) improves 
parliamentary scrutiny for the European Parliament. According to Article 201 of TEU, 
the European Parliament has the right of a motion of censure on the activities of the 
Commission. The “Draft Articles for Title IV of Part I of the Constitution”134 took over 
this wording into Article 18a (3) “The Commission, as a body, shall be responsible to the 
European Parliament. Under the procedures set out at Art. X of the Constitution, it may 
pass a censure motion on the Commission. If such a motion is passed, the members of the 
Commission must all resign […]” Article 19 (3) determines that the Foreign Minister, 
who will be responsible for handling external relations and for coordinating other aspects 
of the Union’s external action, will also be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. 
Therefore, the European Parliament now has the possibility to pass a censure motion 
against the institution which decides in CFSP issues at the EU level. This action was not 
possible with the High Representative for CFSP. The European Parliament requested in 
its “Report on the new European security and defense architecture – priorities and 
                                                 
132 See Article 29 (6) of Part I – Title V of the “Draft Articles on external action on the Constitutional 
Treaty” 
133 See Working Group VII – External action, Final report, point 10 
134 Available at Internet Website http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00691.en03.pdf 
from 31 May 2003 
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deficiencies” from 27 March 2003, that “Article 21 of the TEU [should] not be limited to 
foreign and security policy but also include defense policy, which in practice already 
happens when the Defense Minister of the Presidency reports to the European 
Parliament.”135 The “Draft Article on external action in the Constitutional Treaty” 
provides explicitly, with Article 30, a separate article about “Common security and 
defense policy”. The European Parliament is involved in the same way as within the 
CFSP. Article 30 (8) states, “The European Parliament shall be consulted on the main 
aspects and basic choices of the common security and defense policy, and shall be kept 
informed of how it develops.” 
Article 28 TEU, which deals with the budgetary power of the EP, should, in the 
opinion of the European Parliament, “be revised, since a subsidiary budget in the Council 
can be controlled neither by the national parliaments nor by the European Parliament. 
This is unacceptable, also from the point of view of democratic control.”136 This is 
necessary because “in military operations within the framework of ESDP joint cost (for 
instance, for headquarters – transport, accommodation, equipment and communications 
facilities) should be borne jointly and also entered in the Community budget.”137 
Furthermore, the European Parliament demanded that “any crisis management operation 
of the Union in the context of the Petersberg task should be decided by the Council only 
after consultation of the European Parliament as the only directly elected democratic 
institution at European level; such approval would require an absolute majority.”138  
 
D. DIFFERENT SECURITY STATUS OF THE MEMBER STATES 
The different status of the Member States also weakens the chance of effective 
civilian control. According to the European Council in Edinburgh on 12 December 1992, 
Denmark is not participating in CFSP.139 The future EU Member States Cyprus and 
                                                 
135 See Point 61 of the report 
136 See Report of the European Parliament on the progress achieved in the implementation of the 
common foreign and security policy, page 24 
137 ibid, page 24 
138 See Point 55 of the report 
139 Nevertheless, for the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark addressed 13 
persons to the troop contingency. See EUPM Selection Process as of 20 November 2002 Internet Website 
http://ue.eu.int/eupm/pdf/tableauPersonnel.pdf from 31 May 2003 
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Malta, which both do not participate in the Partnership for Peace Program, will have no 
access to NATO classified information provided to the European Parliament 
The new constitution drafts a structured cooperation for “those Member States 
which fulfill higher criteria for military capabilities and which have made more binding 
commitments to one another in this area with a view to more demanding tasks.”140 In 
addition, Article 30 (7) of Part I – Title V and Article 21 of Part II – Title B of the drafted 
constitution refer to a mutual defense within the framework of the EU. However, it does 
not imply that the Member States which participate in structured cooperation are the 
same that oblige themselves to a mutual defense. Lastly, the Government of Ireland has 
reaffirmed its commitment to its people to hold a referendum in the case of any decision 
of the Union to move to a common defense.141 Therefore, the current and future 
framework of foreign and security policy of the EU allows many different possibilities of 
cooperation of the Member States. This fact makes effective civilian control more 
difficult. A recent example for this development was the “Mini Defense Summit” of 
Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxemburg on 29 April 2003. It seems that because of 
the reluctance of some Member States to grant more rights to the European Union, the 
path of development is similar to that of the common currency, where some Member 
States participate and others not. In general, the decisions regarding the CFSP are taken 
by the European Council and the Council of Ministers unanimously.142 Nevertheless, 
Member States have the possibility to abstain from a unanimous decision, which “shall 
not prevent the adoption of such decision.”143 
 
E. SUMMARY 
The challenges for the European Union regarding the efficient and sufficient 
civilian control of armed forces analyzed in this chapter, encompass the weak 
                                                 
140 See Article 30 (6) of the Draft Articles on external action in the Constitutional Treaty 
141 See Annex III “National Declaration by Ireland” of the Presidency Conclusions – European 
Council Meeting in Seville, 21 and 22 June 2002 Internet Website 
http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/ec/71212.pdf from 31 May 2003 
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involvement of the national parliaments, the restricted access to classified information for 
both the national parliaments and the European Parliament, the restricted right of 
oversight and scrutiny of the European Parliament, and the difference in security status of 
the Member States of the European Union. The two main reasons for the weak 
involvement of the national parliaments are first, that most of them do not participate in 
the decision-making process and second, the lack of information. Access to relevant 
information is also a problem for the European Parliament. It is only granted to a special 
committee, which consists of five members. These members are not allowed to share Top 
Secret information with the other members of the parliament. The rights of the European 
Parliament in oversight and scrutiny have not greatly changed from the current Treaty of 
Nice to the drafted proposals for an EU constitution. The only two differences are that the 
Foreign Minister of the EU will be Vice-President of the Commission, which includes the 
possibility of a motion of censure, and the second change is that the Constitution also 
includes a common security and defense policy. Here the EP has also the right to be 
informed. The differences in the security status of each of the Member States will likely 
remain, and probably increase, since the Constitution now allows a structured 





In the last century, several scholars have offered different theoretical frameworks 
for civilian control of armed forces which shows that there is no single concept. Samuel 
Huntington divided his theory between subjective and objective civilian control and 
preferred the latter as the maximizing of military professionalism. Morris Janowitz’s 
theory of civilian control predicted that armed forces would transform into constabulary 
forces, which have to operate on an international level. Charles Moskos sought to link 
these two concepts and argued that some services of the military forces have converged 
more closely with the political leadership while other services have only a weak 
relationship. In this paper it was shown that at the EU level “civilian control” and 
“democratic control” are interchangeable. The reasons are the Treaty on European Union 
itself and the necessity for states which apply for EU membership to be democracies. 
With the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU also 
implemented Committees and a Military Staff, which are responsible for its execution. A 
comparison showed how the theoretical frameworks of civilian control match with the 
political system of the EU. It has demonstrated that the concept of civilian control, which 
was developed for nation states, fits to the political system of the European Union. The 
main aspect regarding civilian control is the responsibility of the institutions, which are in 
charge for the implementation of the CFSP to the respective parliaments. Since the 
European Union is a unique organization, these responsibilities are divided between the 
Member States and the EU itself.  
The definition of civilian control of armed forces used in this thesis referred to the 
accountability of the institution, which decides on the deployment of military troops, to 
their respective parliament. A comparison of the involvement of the national parliaments 
of the Member States has shown that full involvement of the national parliaments in the 
decision-making process for the deployment of armed forces abroad is only established in 
two Member States, Germany and the Netherlands, and with some respect in Austria. 
Within the other Member States, it is carried out by the respective governments. This 
means, that in most of the Member States of the European Union, civilian control of 
armed forces is exercised in the way that the parliaments scrutinize the governments ex 
 47
post. The problem is not only a limited legitimacy, since the government is not directly 
elected, but also that the national parliaments do not always fully use their possibilities to 
scrutinize the actions of governments. 
The involvement of the European Parliament in civilian control of armed forces at 
the EU level is relatively weak. It encompasses the right to be consulted by the 
presidency and the Commission and the right to ask questions or make recommendations 
to the Council. Additionally, the High Representative is obliged to make statements in the 
European Parliament at least four times a year. The EP exercises its scrutiny via three 
committees – the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Humans Rights, Common Security and 
Defense Policy, the Committee on Budgets, and the Committee on Budgetary Control. 
The main problem is the access to restricted information, which is limited only to a 
Special Committee, which consists of five members. These members are not allowed to 
share Top Secret information with the other members of the Parliament. The rights of the 
European Parliament in oversight and scrutiny have not greatly changed from the current 
Treaty of Nice to the drafted proposals for an EU Constitution. This gives evidence of 
some reluctance of the Member States’ governments to hand over responsibility to the 
elected representatives. The main difference is that the Foreign Minister of the EU will be 
Vice-President of the Commission, which now allows the European Parliament the 
possibility of a motion of censure. Since this motion of censure concerns the European 
Commission, it is an instrument which will be used very carefully by the European 
Parliament. 
These findings lead to some proposals which will be able to rectify some 
deficiencies in the area of civilian control of armed forces. The first proposal is the 
formal participation of representatives of the national parliaments in the information 
sharing of CFSP issues at EU level. This would allow the coordination of parliamentary 
initiative between the national level and the European Union. A second proposal is the 
involvement of the European Parliament in the development of common strategies of the 
European Council. The development of common strategies is not an ad-hoc decision but 
rather, it normally lasts months. Therefore, to increase democratic legitimacy, it is easy to 
arrange that the EP, or at least a committee, is included in this development. Finally, 
censure rules, calling for the resignation of the Commission, should be limited to single 
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commissioners to increase the power of the motion of censure. This would increase the 
power of the EP regarding the Commission not only in the area of CFSP but also in the 
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